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Abstract
■ Evidence from functional neuroimaging studies on resting
state suggests that there are two distinct anticorrelated cortical
systems that mediate conscious awareness: an “extrinsic” system
that encompasses lateral fronto-parietal areas and has been linked
with processes of external input (external awareness), and an “in-
trinsic” system which encompasses mainly medial brain areas and
has been associated with internal processes (internal awareness).
The aim of our study was to explore the neural correlates of resting
state by providing behavioral and neuroimaging data from healthy
volunteers. With no a priori assumptions, we first determined be-
haviorally the relationship between external and internal awareness
in 31 subjects. We found a significant anticorrelation between ex-
ternal and internal awareness with a mean switching frequency of
0.05 Hz (range: 0.01–0.1 Hz). Interestingly, this frequency is simi-
lar to BOLD fMRI slow oscillations. We then evaluated 22 healthy
volunteers in an fMRI paradigm looking for brain areas where BOLD
activity correlated with “internal” and “external” scores. Activation of
precuneus/posterior cingulate, anterior cingulate/mesiofrontal cor-
tices, and parahippocampal areas (“intrinsic system”) was linearly
linked to intensity of internal awareness, whereas activation of lat-
eral fronto-parietal cortices (“extrinsic system”) was linearly asso-
ciated with intensity of external awareness. ■
INTRODUCTION
Consciousness has two components, arousal and aware-
ness (Zeman, 2001). Arousal refers to the levels of alert-
ness or vigilance and involves the activity of the brainstem
reticular formation, hypothalamus, and basal forebrain,
whereas awareness refers to the contents of consciousness
and is related to the activity of a widespread set of fronto-
parietal associative areas. Awareness and arousal are
linearly correlated, in the sense that the less aroused we
get the less aware of our surroundings and ourselves we
become (Laureys, 2005). Furthermore, awareness encom-
passes two components: awareness of the environment (ex-
ternal) and of self (internal) ( James, 1890). We here define
external awareness as the conscious perception of oneʼs
environment through the sensory modalities (e.g., visual,
auditory, somesthetic, or olfactory perception). Internal
awareness is defined as encompassing mental processes
that do not require the mediation of external stimuli or
sensory input (e.g., mind wandering, daydreaming, inner
speech, mental imagery; for a review, see Lieberman,
2007). Growing neuroscientific evidence supports that the
awareness brain network can be subdivided in two main
networks: a fronto-parietal network routinely exhibiting ac-
tivity increases during attention-demanding cognitive tasks,
and a “default network,” which has been involved in self-
related processes (Fox et al., 2005).
The aim of the present study is to better characterize the
subjective cognitive processes inherent to these “external”
and “internal” or “default” networks. We first performed
a behavioral experiment looking for the relationship be-
tween subjective external and internal awareness scores in
31 healthy volunteers. During an eyes-closed resting con-
dition, subjects were asked to score their external and in-
ternal awareness levels by button presses after hearing an
auditory prompt. Next, we performed a functionalmagnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment in 22 subjects look-
ing for the neural correlates of subjective external and in-
ternal awareness scores, correlating external and internal
awareness intensity to changes in blood oxygen level de-
pendent (BOLD) neural activity.
METHODS
Before each experiment, subjects received the following in-
struction: “During the next 15 minutes, we ask you to keep
the eyes closed and to avoid prolonged structured thinking,
such as counting or singing. When you hear a beep, please
use the keyboard to communicate the intensity of ‘external
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awareness’ and ‘internal awareness’ ongoing prior to the
beep. ‘External’ is here defined as perception of environ-
mental sensory stimuli (e.g., auditory, visual, olfactory,
or somesthetic). ‘Internal’ here refers to all environmen-
tal stimuli-independent thoughts (e.g., inner speech, auto-
biographical memories, or wandering thoughts).”
Participants
Behavioral data were acquired from 31 healthy subjects
[21 women, mean (SD) age = 26 (3) years]. Imaging data
were acquired from 22 healthy subjects, different from the
subjects of the behavioral study [10 women, mean (SD)
age = 23 (2) years]; one participant was excluded from
further analysis due to movement artifacts. None of the par-
ticipants had any relevant medical history or used any cen-
trally acting medication. All participants gave their written
informed consent prior to inclusion in the study, which
was approved by the Ethics Committee of the University
of Liège.
Behavioral Experiment
Our experimental exploration consists of two parts. First,
a behavioral experiment was used in order to determine
the relationship between external and internal awareness.
External and internal awareness scores were recorded
using a keyboard. The experiment took place in a quiet
room where the subjects were seated comfortably in a
chair facing the keyboard used for recording awareness
scores. Subjects placed four fingers of both hands (not
the thumb) on the keyboard. For the first behavioral study,
for the half of the subjects, the left hand corresponded
to external awareness (for the other half, the left hand
corresponded to internal awareness; randomized order).
All subjects were instructed to start responding by using
button presses of their left hand on a 4-point scale (0 =
absent; 1 = mild; 2 = moderate; 3 = maximal). The sub-
jectsʼ task was to rate both external and internal awareness
(prompted by a 60-dB beep presented via headphones),
as defined in the instruction mentioned above. Only when
the two scores were given could the next beep be elicited.
Interstimulus interval was randomized between 11.3 and
26.8 sec (mean = 19 ± 8 sec). A familiarization session
(11 responses) preceded the main experiment (66 re-
sponses). Upon completion of the experiment, the content
of external and internal awareness was assessed using a
semistructured interview.
Statistical Analysis
The relationship between ratings of external and internal
awareness was estimated by calculating Spearmanʼs r cor-
relation coefficients (two-tailed) for every subject and then
estimating themean correlation within the sample. In terms
of temporal dynamics, the frequency of switching between
internal and external awareness scores was estimated by
first subtracting the external from internal ratings in order
to get a unique curve for every subject. The frequency spec-
trum of these obtained scores was estimated using the
Lomb periodogram method for unevenly sampled aware-
ness scores (Press, Flannery, Teukolsky, & Vetterling, 1992;
Lomb, 1976).
Imaging Experiment
After having established the relationship between external
and internal awareness with the behavioral experiment
(using responses from both hands), the fMRI study was
performed. Here, in order to reduce the interference with
resting state brain function and to reduce motor responses
and artifacts to the maximum, behavioral responses were
obtained on a single scale reflecting intensity from “more
external” to “more internal” awareness. Hence, for the
fMRI experiment, awareness scores were recorded with
the left hand for all subjects (1 = strongly external, 2 =
moderately external, 3 = moderately internal, and 4 =
strongly internal). During the scanning period, subjects
were asked not to move, to keep their eyes closed, to relax,
and to avoid structured thinking (e.g., counting, singing).
Subjects were presented an auditory beep, on average,
every 20 sec (range = 3–30 sec). After each sound, sub-
jects were asked to evaluate and score by a button press
their state of awareness (“strongly external,” “moderately
external,” “moderately internal,” and “strongly internal”)
for the period preceding the beep. The fMRI study was
terminated when on-line analysis showed 15 responses in
each state of awareness.
Paired Student’s t tests assessed the differences in reac-
tion times between external and internal awareness states.
Similarly to the behavioral experiment, the frequency spec-
trum of awareness scores obtained during the fMRI data
was estimated using the Lomb method for unevenly sam-
pled data (Press et al., 1992; Lomb, 1976).
MRI Acquisition
fMRI time series were acquired on a 3-T head-only scanner
(Magnetom Allegra; Siemens Medical Solutions, Erlangen,
Germany) operated with the standard transmit–receive
quadrature head coil. Multislice T2*-weighted functional
images were acquired with a gradient-echo, echo-planar
imaging sequence using axial slice orientation and cover-
ing the whole brain (32 slices, FoV= 220× 220mm2, voxel
size = 3.4× 3.4 × 3mm3, 30% interslice gap, matrix size =
64 × 64 × 32, TR = 2460 msec, TE = 40 msec, FA = 90°).
The three initial volumes were discarded to avoid T1 satu-
ration effects. For anatomical reference, a high-resolution
T1-weighted image was acquired for each subject [T1-
weighted 3-D magnetization-prepared rapid gradient-echo
sequence, TR= 1960msec, TE= 4.43msec, inversion time









(TI) = 1100 msec, FoV = 230 × 173 mm2, matrix size =
256 × 192 × 176, voxel size = 0.9 × 0.9 × 0.9 mm3].
MRI Analysis
Functional data were preprocessed and analyzed by means
of the Statistical Parametric Mapping software SPM5 (www.
fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm5/; Wellcome Depart-
ment of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK), using a two-
steps procedure (random effect analysis) that took into
account both within- and between-subject variability, as
was published elsewhere (Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2009;
Boly et al., 2007). The first two fMRI volumes were removed
to allow for signal equilibration. Preprocessing steps in-
cluded realignment, spatial normalization, and smoothing
(Friston, Ashburner, et al., 1995; Friston, Holmes, et al.,
1995). The normalization was performed using a three-step
automated procedure (Friston, Ashburner, et al., 1995).
Firstly, the structural T1 scan of each subject was segmented
and normalization parameters were derived from this step
from the subject space to the MNI space. Secondly, the
functional data were coregistered to the structural scan.
Thirdly, the structural and functional scans were normal-
ized using the normalization parameters (voxel size: 2 ×
2 × 2 mm for functional and 1 × 1 × 1 mm for structural
images) derived from the first step. Functional data were
then smoothed using an 8-mm FWHM Gaussian kernel.
Each subjectʼs data were modeled individually with a gen-
eralized linear model (Friston, Holmes, et al., 1995) and
images of effects of interest were produced. These images
were then analyzed with a mixed effects model aimed at
showing stereotypical effect in the population from which
the subjects are drawn (Penny & Holmes, 2003). The mixed
effects model was implemented in two processing steps
accounting for fixed and random effects, respectively (Boly
et al., 2007; Friston, Stephan, Lund, Morcom, & Kiebel,
2005).
For each subject, a first-level intraindividual fixed effects
analysis aimed at modeling the data to partition the ob-
served neurophysiological responses into components of
interest, confounds, and errors by using a general linear
model (Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2009; Boly et al., 2007;
Friston, Holmes, et al., 1995). We created a design matrix
using a block design (lasting 3–30 sec) for every individ-
ual subjects incorporating answers of subjects (“strongly ex-
ternal,” “moderately external,” “moderately internal,” and
“strongly internal”) as regressors of interest, time of beeps,
reaction time, and movement parameters as supplemen-
tary regressors. Reaction times were calculated by subtract-
ing time of answer to time of beep. Movement parameters
were derived from realignment of the functional volumes
(translations in the x, y, and z directions and rotations
around the x, y, and z axes). Reaction times and movement
parameters were included as covariates of no interest in the
design matrix. A first analysis identified stimulus-induced
brain activation in periods rated as “strongly external,” “mod-
erately external,” “moderately internal,” and “strongly in-
ternal.” These periods were incorporated as regressors of
interest in the design matrix using a block design (lasting
3–30 sec). The movements were modeled in supplemen-
tary regressors. Movement parameters derived from realign-
ment of the functional volumes (translations in the x, y, and
z directions and rotations around the x, y, and z axes) were
included as covariates of no interest in the design matrix.
High-pass filtering using a cutoff period of 128 sec was im-
plemented in the design matrix to remove low-frequency
drift from the time series (Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2009;
Boly et al., 2007; Friston et al., 2000). Serial correlations
were estimated using a restricted maximum likelihood
algorithm with an intrinsic autoregressive model during
parameter estimation. The effects of interest were tested
through linear contrasts, generating statistical parametric
maps (SPM{t}) in each subject. Contrasts images were com-
puted, identifying a linear positive correlation with external
thoughts (1.5 0.5 −0.5 −1.5 contrast of the general linear
model parameters) and a linear positive correlation with
internal thoughts (contrast −1.5 −0.5 0.5 1.5). The re-
sulting set of voxel values for each contrast constituted
a map of t statistic (SPM{t}) thresholded at p < .001
(Peigneux et al., 2006). We then smoothed the contrast
images (6 mm FWHMGaussian kernel) in order to improve
statistic across subjects by increasing the overlap between
activated areas of each subject, and balancing the existing
intersubject anatomical variability (Mikl et al., 2008; White
et al., 2001). These smoothed contrast images were en-
tered in a second-level general linear model, acting as a
random effects analysis investigating consistent effects at
the population level. Statistical inferences were then ob-
tained after correction for multiple comparison at the voxel
level using false discovery rate p < .05 (whole head vol-
ume) for areas previously reported to be involved in in-
ternal awareness (i.e., mesiofrontal/anterior cingulate and
precuneal/posterior cingulate cortices; Boly et al., 2007;
Laureys, Perrin, & Bredart, 2007; Mason et al., 2007),
whereas a small volume (8 mm radius sphere) corrected
at p < .05 (Worsley, 1996) was calculated for areas pre-
viously reported to be involved in external awareness (i.e.,
bilateral posterior parietal and dorsolateral prefrontal cor-
tex; Boly et al., 2007; Haynes, Driver, & Rees, 2005; Dehaene
et al., 2001; Vuilleumier et al., 2001), and internal aware-
ness (i.e., mesiofrontal/anterior cingulate and precuneal/
posterior cingulate cortices; Boly et al., 2007; Laureys et al.,
2007; Mason et al., 2007).
RESULTS
Behavioral Experiment
We observed a significant negative correlation between ex-
ternal and internal awareness scores at the group level
(Spearmanʼs r = −.44, p < .02, two-tailed). At the sub-
ject level, 24 participants showed significant negative cor-
relations between internal and external awareness, one
showed a positive correlation, and six participants showed









nonsignificant correlations. The switching between ex-
ternal and internal awareness was calculated to occur,
on average, with a mean frequency of 0.05 ± 0.03 Hz
(SD) frequency (range = 0.01–0.1 Hz) (Figure 1). External
thoughts reported were auditory in 65% of subjects,
somesthetic in 58%, olfactory in 13%, and visual in 1%;
internal thoughts were experiment-related in 52%, auto-
biographical in 42%, and inner speech in 13% of subjects.
The contents of external and internal awareness are sum-
marized in Table 1.
fMRI Experiment
Scanning was ended when on-line analysis showed at least
15 responses in each state of awareness [meaning 18 ±
2 minutes (X ± SD)]. The intensity of internal aware-
ness intensity correlated linearly with activity in posterior
cingulate/precuneal, anterior cingulate/mesiofrontal, and
bilateral parahippocampal cortices (whole-brain false dis-
covery rate <0.05; Figure 2, blue areas; Table 2A). The in-
tensity of external awareness scores correlated linearly with
activity in the bilateral inferior frontal gyrus and inferior pa-
rietal lobule (small-volume correction; Figure 2, red areas;
Table 2B). Additional contrasts looking for linear positive
correlations with external thoughts only (1.5 0.5 0 0), in-
dependently of a linear positive correlation with internal
thoughts only (0 0 0.5 1.5), showed similar results.
Reaction times obtained during the fMRI study did not
differ when subjects were in “extrinsic”modes as compared
to those obtained during “intrinsic” modes of conscious
activity [mean (SD) 1352 (1132) msec vs. 1427 (837) msec;
t(20) = 0.72, p = .48].The switching between external
and internal awareness was calculated (Laguna, Moody, &
Mark, 1998) to occur with a mean (SD) frequency of 0.03
(0.004) Hz (range = 0.03–0.4 Hz). The mean duration
of periods of external [mean (SD) = 28 (41) sec] versus
internal awareness [29 (66) sec] was not significantly differ-
ent ( p = .35).
Figure 1. The temporal dynamics of the two components of awareness in a representative subject illustrating that external and internal
awareness scores anticorrelate.
Table 1. The Contents of the Two Components of Awareness Based on Semistructured Interview after Completion of the
Behavioral Experiment
Content Number of Subjects (%) Examples
External
Auditory 20 (65) Hearing sounds from outside the room
Somesthetic 18 (58) Felt itchiness, uncomfortable body posture
Olfactory 4 (13) Smelling perfume
Visual 2 (1) Visual perceptions through closed eyelids
Internal
Experiment-related 16 (52) Thoughts related to the length of the study
Autobiographical (future and past) 13 (42) Vacation, plans for weekend
Inner speech 4 (13) Instruction to oneself to stay vigilant










Growing neuroscientific evidence supports the idea that
the brainʼs intrinsic or default activity is essential to its
global functioning (Raichle & Snyder, 2007). This notion
was initially stressed by positron emission tomography
studies, which revealed metabolic decreases in specific
brain areas (e.g., posterior cingulate/precuneal and ante-
rior cingulate/medial–prefrontal cortices) during perfor-
mance of specific cognitive tasks as compared to passive
resting state (Shulman et al., 1997). Raichle and Snyder
(2007) and Raichle et al. (2001) considered these “deactiva-
tions” as deviations from an ongoing metabolic/physiologic
baseline which characterizes the functionality not only of
the aforementioned areas, the so-called default network,
but also of most areas of the brain. Searching for joined
Figure 2. Brain regions showing a correlation between BOLD signal and the intensity of internal and external awareness scores in 22 healthy
volunteers. Stronger internal awareness scores correlate with increased activity in anterior cingulate/mesiofrontal, posterior cingulate/precuneal,
and parahippocampal cortices (areas in blue). External awareness scores correlate with increased activity in bilateral inferior parietal lobule and
dorsolateral prefrontal cortices (in red).
Table 2. Peak Voxels of Brain Areas Showing a Positive Correlation with Intensity of External and Internal Awareness
Region x (mm) y (mm) z (mm) Z p
(A) Internal
PCC/precuneus −10 −42 8 4.68 <.0001a
ACC/mesiofrontal −12 20 38 5.01 <.0001a
Left parahippocampal −24 −18 −20 3.87 <.0001a
Right parahippocampal 38 −30 −10 4.76 <.0001a
(B) External
R Inferior frontal gyrus 38 44 4 2.66 .004b
L Inferior frontal gyrus −36 32 16 2.25 ns (.012)
R Inferior parietal 60 −42 32 2.86 .002b
L Inferior parietal −58 −30 22 2.49 ns (.006)
R = right; L = left; PCC = posterior cingulate cortex; ACC = anterior cingulate cortex; ns = nonsignificant.
aFalse discovery rate corrected.
bSmall-volume corrected (8 mm radius sphere centered on previously published coordinates).









activations in this “default state,” two meta-analyses of
positron emission tomography activation protocols with
healthy subjects revealed that a network of frontal and
parietal heteromodal associative cortices was more ac-
tive at rest as compared to other cognitive tasks (Mazoyer
et al., 2001; Shulman et al., 1997). Such evidence led to
the assumption that the brain at rest is not silent. On the
contrary, the brainʼs activity at rest is characterized by spon-
taneous low-frequency fluctuations, in the range of 0.01–
0.1 Hz, which can be detected in the BOLD signal of the
fMRI measurement in “resting” conditions. These spon-
taneous BOLD fluctuations cannot be attributed to pe-
ripheral noise (e.g., cardiac and respiratory fluctuations,
motion of the subject) but show synchronized activity with
other functionally related brain regions (Fox & Raichle,
2007; Cordes et al., 2000). In particular, it is suggested that
the brainʼs baseline activity is organized in two widespread
brain networks: “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” (Boly et al., 2007;
Fox & Raichle, 2007; Golland et al., 2007; Tian et al., 2007;
Fox et al., 2005; Fransson, 2005; Cordes et al., 2000). The
extrinsic system encompasses lateral fronto-parietal areas,
resembling the brain activations during goal-directed
behavior, and it has been linked to cognitive processes
of somatosensory (Boly et al., 2007; Bornhovd et al.,
2002; Buchel et al., 2002), visual (Fuhrmann Alpert, Hein,
Tsai, Naumer, & Knight, 2008; Rees, 2007), and auditive
(Fuhrmann Alpert et al., 2008) external sensory input.
The intrinsic system encompasses mainly medial brain
areas, is similar to the activity of the default network, and
has been associated with cognitive processes such as mind
wandering or daydreaming (Mason et al., 2007; McKiernan,
DʼAngelo, Kaufman, & Binder, 2006), mental imagery
(Knauff, Fangmeier, Ruff, & Johnson-Laird, 2003), inner
speech and self-oriented thoughts (Goldberg, Harel, &
Malach, 2006; Lou et al., 2004).
The present study aimed to bridge the gap between our
knowledge on default resting state neural networks as as-
sessed by fMRI and their subjective cognitive counterparts.
In our behavioral experiment, we showed a negative cor-
relation between external and internal awareness scores
in nearly 80% of the studied subjects (24 out of 31 par-
ticipants). It should be noted that despite the significant
anticorrelation between external and internal modes of
conscious processing at the group level, there seems to
exist a substantial variability at the individual subject level.
Future studies could correlate this variability of conscious
content with personality traits (e.g., from normal controls
to “schizoid” subjects with dissociative contents of con-
sciousness). We also showed a periodic shift from external
to internal awareness occurring, on average, every 20 sec
(0.05Hz), corresponding to the spontaneous low-frequency
fluctuations (range of 0.01–0.1 Hz) previously reported
(Fox & Raichle, 2007; Cordes et al., 2000). Engagement to
demanding self-oriented tasks makes us less receptive
to environmental stimuli ( James, 1890) and this switch
in attention can happen without conscious recognition
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). In the absence of conscious
control, human minds like to wander during both resting
periods and heavily loaded cognitive tasks (Giambra, 1995;
Antrobus, 1968). Such stimulus-independent thoughts are
reported significantly more often during rest than when
performing externally oriented tasks (e.g., tone detection
task; Filler & Giambra, 1973) and during tasks that are over-
learned as compared to novel ones (Goldberg et al., 2006).
This unconstrained mental activity was shown to impair
signal detection (Giambra, 1995; Singer, 1993), reading
(Antrobus, 1968), detailed encoding (Teasdale et al., 1995),
and sustained attention tasks (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). In
this sense, psychological research suggests that deprivation
of external sensory input may result in an increase of inter-
nally generated activity (Smallwood,McSpadden, & Schooler,
2008; Schooler, Reichle, & Halpern, 2005; Schooler, 2002;
Giambra, 1995). However, clinical cases such as Charles–
Bonnet syndrome (i.e., visually impaired patients that experi-
ence visual illusions) might counterbalance these findings
(Kester, 2009).
Our fMRI study showed a link between the intrinsic
and extrinsic brain networks and spontaneous menta-
tion. In the fMRI experiment, subjectsʼ reports of being
“strongly externally aware” correlated with activation in
the “extrinsic system” (i.e., lateral fronto-parietal areas)
and reports of being “strongly internally aware” correlated
with activation in the “intrinsic system” (i.e., medial brain
areas). Our data are in line with previous studies showing
the competing character of the two systems in the sense
that these two systems can disturb or even interrupt one
another (Tian et al., 2007; Weissman, Roberts, Visscher, &
Woldorff, 2006), illustrated also by studies on motor per-
formance (Fox, Snyder, Vincent, & Raichle, 2007), percep-
tual discrimination (Sapir, dʼAvossa, McAvoy, Shulman, &
Corbetta, 2005), attention lapses (Weissman et al., 2006),
and somatosensory perception of stimuli close to sensory
threshold (Boly et al., 2007). These studies have shown
that high prestimulus baseline activity in the intrinsic sys-
tem is associated with a tendency to ignore environmental
stimuli, whereas perceived external stimuli were associated
with an increased activity in the extrinsic system. The pre-
dictive value of the prestimulus baseline activity to behav-
ior has been also shown by studies with EEG (Sapir et al.,
2005) and magnetoencephalography (Linkenkaer-Hansen,
Nikulin, Palva, Ilmoniemi, & Palva, 2004). It should be noted
that, to date, no definite answer can be given as to whether
these two systems constitute the causal correlates of in-
ternal and external awareness. The sufficiency and neces-
sity of these two components to consciousness remains
to be further explored by, for example, transcranial mag-
netic stimulation lesional protocols or other more invasive
methodologies.
Although it has been suggested that the low-frequency
fluctuations observed at resting state reflect nothing but
vascular processes (Lamme, 2003), others support that
they refer to conscious mentation (Goldberg et al., 2006).
According to our results, collected via a semistructured inter-
view, the content of spontaneous thought was preferentially









autobiographical and referred to mental images, remi-
niscent of past experiences and plan making, which
correspond to accumulating data that the default network is
mediating self-related processes (Golland, Golland, Bentin,
& Malach, 2008; Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Li, Yan,
Bergquist, & Sinha, 2007; Mitchell et al., 2007; Hester, Foxe,
Molholm, Shpaner, & Garavan, 2005; Naghavi & Nyberg,
2005; Sapir et al., 2005; Otten & Rugg, 2001). Several other
explanations have been introduced for the functional
role of the resting state, such that it reflects spontaneous
thoughts (Buckner & Carroll, 2007) or that it accounts
for the monitoring of the external world (for a review,
see Hahn, Ross, & Stein, 2007). Nevertheless, the per-
vasiveness of the default network after general anesthe-
sia in monkeys (Vincent et al., 2007), in vegetative state
(only cortico-cortical connectivity), and its absence in brain
death (Boly et al., in press), reflects a fundamental in-
trinsic property of the brainʼs organization that seems to
transcend the levels of consciousness (Boly et al., in press;
Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008). Future stud-
ies could apply the presented methodology to modified
states of consciousness such as hypnosis. We hypothesize
that in hypnotic resting state, internal and external modes
would be dissociated with a predominance of intrinsic net-
work activity.
The critical role of the extrinsic and intrinsic systems
to consciousness is well illustrated in cases of impaired
conscious states. For example, in the vegetative state (a
state of arousal without awareness, Laureys, 2005), system-
atic metabolic dysfunctions have been identified in a wide
fronto-parietal network encompassing the bilateral lateral
and frontal regions, the bilateral parieto-temporal and pos-
terior parietal areas, posterior cingulate cortex, and the
precuneus (Laureys, 2005; Laureys et al., 1999). In addi-
tion, disconnections between latero-frontal and midline
posterior areas and between thalamic nuclei and lateral
and medial frontal cortices have been also found in vegeta-
tive patients (Laureys et al., 1999, 2000). The lack of exter-
nal and internal awareness is observed not only in these
patients but also in slow-wave sleep (Maquet et al., 2005)
and in general anesthesia (Kaisti et al., 2003), whereas
they resume their functionality during REM sleep (Maquet
et al., 2005), supporting our findings.
In conclusion, our data shed light on the neural cor-
relates of awarenessʼ two major dimensions: external
or environmental awareness relating to activity in lateral
fronto-parietal associative networks and internal aware-
ness relating to midline “default” networks. The study of
the functional integrity of these two interdependent brain
networks may offer clinical interest in our search for neu-
ral markers of awareness in heath and disease (e.g., coma
and related “vegetative” states).
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